British Banks\u27 Role in U.K. Capital Markets since the Big Bang by Hablutzel, Philip N.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 1 Chicago-Kent Dedication Symposium Article 27
December 1992
British Banks' Role in U.K. Capital Markets since
the Big Bang
Philip N. Hablutzel
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Philip N. Hablutzel, British Banks' Role in U.K. Capital Markets since the Big Bang, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 365 (1992).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol68/iss1/27
BRITISH BANKS' ROLE IN U.K. CAPITAL MARKETS
SINCE THE BIG BANG
PHILIP N. HABLUTZEL*
In the Fall of 1986, two legal events occurred in the United King-
dom which became known as the "Big Bang." First, on October 27, the
actual "Big Bang" was a reform in the operation of the Stock Exchange
in the form of a settlement between the Exchange and the Government
regarding claims that the Exchange had been anticompetitive. Particular
practices complained of were the fixed brokerage commissions and the
separation of brokers (who could not act on their own account) and job-
bers (market-makers could not act for customers). The Big Bang abol-
ished fixed commissions and the distinction between brokers and
jobbers.1
Then, on November 7, 1986, the Financial Services Act began com-
ing into force, a process completed by April 29, 1988. The new Act reor-
ganized the securities and investments business, created a new
government agency, the Securities and Investments Board ("SIB"), and
provided for the delegation of duties and powers to some self-regulating
organizations ("SROs"). 2
These two events were intended 3 to reform the legal regulation of
capital markets in the UK and to expand them. This Essay will explore a
portion of the experience since 1986 by looking at the availability of capi-
tal to small and medium-sized British firms, the bond market and the
banks' role in that market, and the non-legal character of the regulation
of that market.
I. BEFORE BIG BANG
A brief description of some aspects of the British capital markets
prior to 1986 should be given in order to show the role of banks and bank
* Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program in Financial Services Law, Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tchology; B.A. 1958, A.M. 1961, J.D. 1967, Univer-
sity of Chicago. I wish to thank the law school for the opportunity to spend the fall, 1992 semester
in London and to thank the Institute For Advanced Legal Studies, University of London for its
assistance and hospitality.
1. CLIFFORD CHANCE, DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 44.02[3] (1991) [here-
inafter CLIFFORD CHANCE].
2. Id. at 46A.01. The text of the statute will be cited from BUTIERWORTHS COMPANY
LAW HANDBOOK 2431-3000 (Keith Walmsley ed., 8th ed. 1991) [hereinafter BUTrERWORTHS].
3. MARGARET REID, ALL-CHANGE IN THE CITY: THE REVOLUTION IN BRITAIN'S FINAN-
CIAL SECTOR 11 (1988) [hereinafter REID].
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lending in that market. One difficulty facing an American observer is
that many of the ordinary financial terms have different or even opposite
meanings in Britain.
The Bank of England was organized in 1694 as a private institution
in which subscribers would invest £1,200,000, and the Bank would in
turn lend that amount to the government at 8 percent interest.4 The
Bank, as one of its numerous functions, acts as the government's banker
and borrows on behalf of the government by issuing government securi-
ties.' These government bonds (or rather bonds of the Bank of England
issued on behalf of government) are called "Gilt-edged," or simply
"gilts," and can be undated, or due in 5 years or less ("shorts"), from 5
to 15 years ("mediums"), or over 15 years ("longs"). 6
These bonds, like all bonds in British markets, are called "stock."
In contrast, an equity investment in a private corporation is called a
"share." Shareholders receive dividends (they hope) and have a vote
(usually) at the General Meeting. Long before it was ordinary for private
corporations to issue shares to investors, there was a need to create a
secondary market in government-issued "stock" and hence a Stock Ex-
change developed. "There was, and still is, more dealing volume on the
Exchange in gilt-edged stocks than in British shares and this was particu-
larly so in the 1970s and early 1980s when British governments were
churning out new gilts to finance big [b]udget deficits."'7
Keeping in mind that the Stock Exchange is primarily a secondary
market for government securities, providing their holders with liquidity,
one should look at a second development, the rise of bank deposits. As
banks, particularly the "big four" Clearing Banks,8 solicited deposit ac-
counts from customers, practices developed differently than in the
United States. An individual or business may have a "current account,"
which in the United States would be a "demand deposit," or more popu-
larly a "checking account." No interest is paid on current accounts, and
the fee for maintaining one is normally about £12 (about $20) per month.
4. BANK OF ENGLAND, BANK OF ENGLAND MUSEUM (Sandra Lea ed., 1989). This was the
beginning of England's "national debt." The bank was nationalized under the Bank of England Act
of 1946.
5. This function is performed in the United States by a department of the government, the
Treasury.
6. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 1, at 45.02 [2][c].
7. REID, supra note 3, at 24.
8. In order of size, ranked by Tier 1 capital in 1992: Barclays ($11,637m), National Westmin-
ster ($10,453m), Lloyds ($4,822m), and Midland ($4,272m). Ranked by assets size, the four are:
Barclays ($258,339m), National Westminster ($229,272m), Midland ($111,126m), and Lloyds
($95,971m). All data as of December, 1991. Cloudy on the Continent, THE BANKER, Sept. 1992, at
68, 70, 87.
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Proposals made in September, 1992 were to double these fees. With-
drawals may be made at the bank or one of its many "service tills"
(ATMs). Checks can be written and used, but checks are not used as
widely as in the United States. Retail purchases are made with credit
cards, and bills such as utility bills can be paid at any branch Post Office,
using its National Girobank system. A current account customer can
also arrange for overdraft authority, paying an agreed "base rate" per-
centage interest on any such funds borrowed, a rate which is calculated
daily by the bank. One is impressed by the seeming casualness in distin-
guishing between the customer as a creditor of the bank (a depositor) and
as a debtor to the bank. A 1974 standard banking law text casually ad-
vises "[w]hen such an overdraft is to be substantial in amount, and is to
be available over a long period, it is usually considered advisable that it
should be provided by means of a separate account which will be de-
scribed as a 'loan account.' ",9
A third area to examine is the development of "bills" as a source of
capital for businesses. The trading houses in the eighteenth century, par-
ticularly those facilitating foreign trade, provided the credit for their cus-
tomers by endorsing, or "accepting" bills of exchange.' 0 As these
trading houses then became the "merchant banks," their status as "ac-
cepting houses" obtained some special privileges from the Bank of Eng-
land. Anthony Sampson11 lists the Accepting Houses by year of
founding and gives their 1982 assets:
Assets
Year Name £ Million
1763 Baring Brothers 622
1804 Rothschild's 830
1804 Schroder Wagg 2,477
1810 Brown Shipley 302
1830 Kleinwort, Benson 3,155
1831 Hill Samuel 1,904
1836 Guinness Mahon 378
1838 Morgan Granfell 1,766
1839 Hambros 1,640
1853 Samuel Montagu 1,821
1870 Lazard Brothers 931
1880 Charterhouse Japhet 593
1907 Singer & Friedlander 318
1919 Rea Brothers 142
1932 Robert Fleming 242
1946 S.G. Warburg 2,137
9. LORD CHORLEY & J. MILNES HOLDEN, LAW OF BANKING 217 (6th ed. 1974).
10. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 1, at 45.02[c][i].
11. ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE CHANGING ANATOMY OF BRITAIN 315 (1983).
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There are about twenty other merchant banks in addition to the "ac-
cepting houses." Some from each group are also "issuing houses," which
specialize in bringing new issues of shares to the Stock Exchange for sale.
In the United States, the corporation issuing the new shares would be
termed the "issuer," while the role these "issuing houses" play would be
termed "underwriting."' 12 A narrower group of banks are the "discount
houses" which discount bills of exchange and other bills [hence doing
lending] using short-term deposits from other banks and balancing
through a special privilege of borrowing at the bank rate from the Bank
of England. 13 The Bank uses this as one of the mechanisms of informal
control: "In the 1930s there began a practice which still persists: The
Governor [of the Bank] or his deputy meet representatives [of the eleven
discount houses] weekly."' 14 A much wider group of banks, some 110,
rediscount "eligible bills," which must be drawn in pounds by a U.K.
company in relation to a domestic trading transaction.15
Given these diverse and active "bills" markets plus the ability to
overdraft, one can then question how much British businesses used the
two traditional sources of debt capital in the United States: formal bank
loans and the issuance of corporate bonds.' 6 The loan business would
seem basic to the business of banking. The bank obtains funds through
deposits in either "current accounts" or "deposit accounts."' 17 A 1970s
text describes the business and the legal consequences:
[F]rom the banker's point of view, the whole of this business is carried
on so that the bankers may make available the sums which he borrows
from one group of his customers to finance the business and the other
operations of another group---the first group being his creditors, the
second group being his debtors ....
This latter aspect of banking [loans], basic as it is, gives rise to few
legal problems, except on the side of the security aspect: That is in
respect of the various types of security which bankers are prepared to
accept for the repayment of the loans which they make. As a result of
this it is only the subject of security for advances which receives sub-
stantial treatment in textbooks on banking .... 18
12. While the British use of "underwriter" has a narrower, more traditional meaning of a
guarantor.
13. In U.S. terminology, by using the Fed's discount window.
14. MICHAEL CLARKE, REGULATING THE CITY: COMPETITION, SCANDAL AND REFORM 14
(1986).
15. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 1, at $ 45.02[l][iii].
16. We will leave aside the third and now expanding area of commercial paper.
17. Deposit accounts are longer term bank deposits, sharing many characteristics with pre-
1970s U.S. savings accounts: interest is paid, no checks may be written on them, and some notice
may be required for withdrawals. See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 1, at 45.03 [l][b].
18. CHORLEY & MILNES, supra note 9, at 215. For such an extensive treatment, see L.C.
MATHER, SECURITIES ACCEPTABLE TO THE LENDING BANKER (2d ed. 1966). Mather describes a
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Generally, corporations have looked to banks and their funds de-
rived from deposits as the source of debt capital.1 9 And corporations,
"limited companies" in Britain, have been the large borrowers of such
bank funds.20 Nevertheless, British banks were faulted for not channel-
ing enough funds to British industry:
With the growth of Eurodollars the City has rediscovered some of its
nineteenth-century cosmopolitanism and a little of its daring. But the
bankers have much less connection with British life on the other side
of the moat-with the endless, slow problems of industry, technology,
labor and unions. Viewed from the old City boardrooms, Britain's in-
dustrial effort looks like a phenomenon which has come and gone,
while banks go on forever ....
Were the bankers to blame for not investing in British industry?
It is an old argument, going back to the bleak years of the thirties, or
to the post-war years when the Japanese and Germans were putting all
their capital into their industry, which was leaping ahead of the Brit-
ish. The British banks preferred to provide credit for ordinary custom-
ers who could repay their loans quickly; ....
A forceful case against the banks was made in 1980 by Lord
Lever, the former cabinet minister, and George Edwards, a post office
economist. "Many of Britain's economic ills," they said, "can be
traced in whole or in part to the historic distortion in our credit system
... the financial arrangements which enabled us to buy and confidently
maintain our houses are not available to our factories. ' 21
Available bank funds, primarily from the "second tier" of banks
(not the Big Four clearing banks), were lent to real estate developers.
The ensuing banking crisis provided insights on how the Bank of Eng-
land would handle a banking liquidity crisis.22 The first step in re-
type of security not commonly used in the United States: A life insurance policy. "Compared with
the average guarantee a life policy, providing it has an adequate surrender value, is a much more
tangible, reliable and acceptable banking security." Id. at 79. From a later legal text: "A detailed
discussion of all doctrines applying to loans is outside the scope of this work. They fall within the
domain of the general law of contract." E.P. ELLINGER, MODERN BANKING LAW 488 (1987).
19. "For centuries, the vast majority of externally financed investments have been funded by
banks, for which demandable-debt instruments (bank notes and checking accounts) have been the
principal source of funds." Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable
Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, AMER. ECON. REV., June 1991, at 497.
20. "In modern times most of the large borrowers from the banks are limited companies." J.
Milnes Holden, Securities for Banker's Advances, in 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKING 345
(5th ed. 1970).
21. SAMPSON, supra note 11, at 315-316. Sampson then refers to "the vacuum left by the disap-
pearance of corporate bonds." Id. at 317.
22. "The most recent period of difficulties in the United Kingdom occurred in 1973-76, as a
result of the sharp fall in property prices. This development triggered off the secondary bank crisis,
which led to the failure of a number of fringe houses in the City, and exercised a good deal of
pressure on some medium sized and even substantial banks. To prevent a general loss in trust in
financial institutions, the Bank of England launched the 'lifeboat operation,' joining fronts with the
sound banks in order to bail out the endangered bodies." ELLINGER, supra note 18, at 25. A book-
length description is given in MARGARET REID, THE SECONDARY BANKING CRISIS, 1973-75: ITS
CAUSES AND COURSE (1982).
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forming the British Banking System was the Banking Act of 1979. "The
Banking Act of 1979 was proclaimed as an instrument to regularize the
position of these new banks ['the so-called secondary banks'], to establish
a formal basis for depositor protection, and to formalize the supervision
of banking." 23
One of the structural problems was the role to be played by London
as an international financial center. New York serves as the financial
center of the world's largest economy. Whatever "foreign" business is
done in New York was, until recently, mere icing on the cake. Tokyo
served as the financial center of the world's second largest economy. Un-
til the 1980s, this made it important no matter how much or how little
"foreign business" it did. London has been a different case, at least since
the first World War.24 To serve as the third of the world's major finan-
cial centers, London needs to deal in foreign business: the small size of
the U.K. economy does not, by itself, provide the base. To compete on
price, London must persuade its national and local taxing authorities to
keep transaction taxes low or non-existent. To keep the markets quick
and efficient, government regulation is kept informal and non-legal. The
Bank of England "guides" its regulatees informally. Formal legal rules
slow things up: one must seek lawyers' opinions and one must on occa-
sion litigate. The genius and success of the London market was no laws
and no lawyers. On the other hand, as the London market opened up to
second tier and "fringe" banks, even to foreign banks, these aggressive
players, not of the Old Boy network, became harder to guide by informal
processes. For the Banking Act of 1979,
... the traditionally highly informal relationship between the Bank of
England and the other banks was supposed to have been modified in
the light of the proliferation of the new secondary banks and of the
influx of foreign banks establishing themselves in the City. In fact, the
Bank of England, jealous of its independence from the Government
and Whitehall and keen to preserve the speed and flexibility involved
in its informal style of control, took steps to limit severely the formali-
zation of control and accountability implied by the 1979 Act, and the
consequences of this became evermore embarrassingly plain in the
wake of a failure of a bank in 1984.25
The other developments which set the stage for Big Bang were Brit-
ain's becoming a full member of the European Economic Community in
January, 1973 and the abolition of controls over foreign exchange at the
23. CLARKE, supra note 14, at 12.
24. "[T]here was no net rise in the country's real wealth between 1913 and 1951 because a 50
percent increase in domestic assets was offset by sales of foreign assets and the shouldering of more
debt to finance war and recovery needs." REID, supra note 3, at 7.
25. CLARKE, supra note 14, at 12.
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end of 1979.26
II. BIG BANG
The actual form of the Big Bang reform of the Stock Exchange was
an accord between the Exchange and the Government. The immediate
cause was rooted in antitrust law. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of
1956 abolished "resale price maintenance." The Fair Trading Act of
1973 extended the concept to services, and the concept was implemented
by the Restrictive Trade Practices (Services) Order of 1976. The Stock
Exchange had tried but failed to be exempted from the Order. Thus the
Exchange rules on fixed commissions and its separation of brokers from
jobbers (market makers) became an issue for the Government's Director
General of Fair Trading. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) began the
case in 1979.27 As the case wended its way through investigations, dis-
coveries, depositions and change of Government, some feeling developed
that a negotiated settlement short of trial would serve all interests better.
The settlement was effected by a new Act of Parliament, the Restrictive
Practices (Stock Exchange) Act, effective March 13, 1984.28
The terms of the settlement provided that the new arrangements
would take effect two and one half years later, thus providing for a transi-
tion period during which the various financial institutions could make
necessary adjustments. October 27, 1986, a Monday, was agreed as "Big
Bang" day when the major changes would go into effect. "Single capac-
ity," with brokers representing customers only and jobbers dealing on
their own account only, would be abolished. The rules requiring fixed
commissions on brokered transactions would end. Brokerage firms could
become up to 29.9% owned by foreign interests, which percentage would
be increased later to 100%. Additional members would be allowed onto
the Stock Exchange, including foreigners. With no Glass-Steagall Act,29
banks could purchase brokers and jobbers. The government blessed the
event by cutting the Stamp Tax, the tax on securities transfers.
During the two years between March, 1984 and March, 1986, an
explosion of mergers and acquisitions took place.30 Most of the larger
banks (but not Lloyds) bought jobber firms, gaining the expertise in deal-
26. ELLINGER, supra note 18, at vii.
27. This entire story is described in REID, supra note 3, at 23-50.
28. Id. at 49.
29. While the Glass-Steagall Act was the name of the Banking Act of 1933, now the core of the
National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C., the term usually refers to those sections of the 1933 compromise
act which require that commercial banks stay out of most parts of the securities business, particu-
larly underwriting.
30. Described in REID, supra note 3, at 51-70.
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ing in shares and stocks while providing the larger capital necessary to do
so. The banks also bought brokerage houses, with their customer net-
works. The government bond market (the "gilts") was also restructured.
In the early 1980s, most gilts were placed through a few jobbers, 80%
through only two houses. A new system of "primary dealers," patterned
after U.S. practice, was established. Thirty-one of the largest British and
foreign houses applied to the Bank to become gilt market-makers and
after two withdrawals, twenty-nine were so designated.
The total price tag the banks and the foreign firms paid for the bro-
ker and jobber firms has been estimated at £1.5 billion. 31 An almost
equal amount was needed to capitalize the new broker-dealer firms and
to invest in the new computer technology necessary to deal with a new
computerized trading system32 and an expanded market.
The second leg of Big Bang reform was the Financial Services Act of
1986 ("FSA"), initially coming into force on November 7, 1986. Before
that Act, there was little legal control of the investments industry, in
stark contrast with the U.S. or France. 33 Three directives of the EEC34
had been issued which were designed to further the process of "harmoni-
zation" of corporation law and securities law throughout the EEC. The
directives required certain disclosures for the initial listing of stock,
ongoing disclosure requirements of listed companies, and that each EEC
member State have a "competent authority" to enforce the require-
ments. 35
The key provision of FSA is Section 3:
No person shall carry on, or purport to carry on, investment business
in the United Kingdom unless he is an authorized person under Chap-
ter III or an exempted person under Chapter IV of this Part of this
Act.
3 6
Schedule 1 of the Act lists "Investments and Investment Business"
31. Id. at 66. The bulk of this money went personally to the partners of the selling firms who
took it at capital gains rates. It was therefore "lost" as capital to the financial services sector.
32. The London Stock Exchange was the first traditional exchange to become computerized.
Id. at 90.
33. GEOFFREY MORSE, CHARLESWORTH & MORSE COMPANY LAW 484 (14th ed. 1991).
34. Council Directives Nos. 79/279/EEC, 80/390/EEC, and 82/121/EEC. See CLIFFORD
CHANCE, supra note 1, at $ 44.01, n.4.2. Regarding the EEC endeavor: "In 1985, the Commission
of the European Community (EC) put forward 282 proposals for the completion of the internal
market .... By the end of November, 1991, the Commission had formulated all proposals, 217 of
them have been approved by the Council and around 70% of those have been implemented in na-
tional laws." Damien J. Neven, Regulatory Reform in the European Community, AMER. ECON.
REv., May 1992, at 98.
35. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 1, at 44.01.
36. Financial Services Act (FSA), 1986, Sec. 3, in BUTrERWORTHS, supra note 2, at 2433.
The FSA runs 158 pages, with 43 pages of 17 schedules and 13 pages of an Appendix of effective
dates. See generally MORSE, supra note 33, at 485-90.
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and defines "investments" to include shares, debentures ("including de-
benture stock, loan stock, bonds, certificates of deposit.. .,),37 govern-
ment securities, warrants, options on any security or on currencies or
precious metals, futures, contracts for differences, long term insurance
contracts and various rights. 38 The "Activities Constituting Investment
Business" include the buying, selling or underwriting of any "invest-
ments," arranging deals in investments, managing investments, giving or
offering investment advice, and establishing collective investment
schemes. 39 A violation of Section 3 is a criminal offense,40 as is providing
false or misleading statements in any application under or in compliance
with any requirement of the Act.4'
There are a number of ways a person may become "authorized."
One is authorized if one is a member of one of the self-regulating organi-
zations (SROs) under the Act.4 2 Also authorized is a member of a recog-
nized professional body,43 an authorized insurance company,44 a
registered friendly society,45 or the operator or trustee of a collective in-
vestment scheme.46 The Secretary of State may grant authorization di-
rectly. 47 Beginning April 29, 1988, a person is authorized if authorized
in another member state of the EEC.48
A third, but minor leg of the reforms centered around Big Bang was
the Banking Act of 1987 which replaced the Banking Act of 1979. "The
Act provides for two types of deposit-taking institutions, namely, (a) rec-
ognized banks, and (b) licensed deposit takers. This division was not
37. The British use of "debenture" is opposite of its use in the United States. In Britain, deben-
ture refers to a bond which is backed by a security of some kind. In United States usage, a debenture
is an unsecured corporate bond.
38. FSA, Schedule 1, Part I, in BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 2, at 2640.
39. FSA, Schedule 1, Part II, id. at 2641.
40. FSA Sec. 4, id. at 1 2434.
41. FSA, See. 200, id. at 2627.
42. The five sector SROs are: The Securities Association (TSA), the Association of Futures
Brokers and Dealers; the Investment Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO); the Financial
Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA) and the Life Assurance
and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization (LAUTRO). The umbrella body for the sector SROs is the
Securities and Investment Board (SIB), a private company with up to eighteen board members,
appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (a Government Minister) and the Gover-
nor of the Bank of England. See REID, supra note 3, at 248-50. See FSA, Secs. 7-14, in BUT-
TERWORTHS, supra note 2, at 2437-2444 and FSA, Schedule 2, id., at 2644.
43. See FSA, Secs. 15-21, in BUTrERWORTHS supra note 2, at $ 2445-51. An example is the
Institute of Chartered Accountants.
44. FSA, Sec. 22, id. at $ 2452.
45. FSA, Sec. 23, id. at 2453. A "friendly society" is a type of mutual insurance group, whose
"members are pledged to provide assistance to one another in old age, in illness, and in similar
situations." NORMAN W. SCHUR, BRITISH ENGLISH, A TO ZED 146 (1991).
46. FSA, Sec. 24, in BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 2, at 2454.
47. FSA, Secs. 25-30, id. at 2455-60.
48. FSA, Secs. 31-34, id. at 2461-64. For effective date, see FSA Appendix, id. at 3000.
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required by the EEC Banking Directive."' 49 The Act continued the De-
posit Protection Board and the Deposit Protection Fund. 50 Meanwhile,
the basic law of corporations had been reformed and consolidated in the
Companies Act of 198551 which implemented various EEC Directives.
Two additional directives were implemented in the amendments of the
Companies Act of 1989.52
III. SINCE BIG BANG
There have been two distinct periods since Big Bang. The first, al-
most exactly one year long, lasted until the world-wide stock market
crash of October, 1987. 5 3 The second period is the slow recovery since
then to the present day. During the first period, all accounts of the effect
of Big Bang were that it was successful. 54 Share transaction volume in-
creased, customers paid less in commissions, international transactions
increased. The British experience could be pointed to as an example for
other EEC countries to follow:
As a generalization, it is probably true to say that the UK financial
system's exposure to the impact of international integration began ear-
lier, and has so far been greater, than in the case of the other major
European countries. The case of the UK therefore incites more inter-
est because of the possibility that certain features of its experience may
be repeated in other countries where, under the particular influence of
the 1992 programme, deregulation and integration are now proceeding
at a greater pace. 55
Nevertheless, by 1992, the general recession had hit UK banks and
they were suffering. "More than two-thirds of London's foreign bank
branches are not making much money."' 56 Domestic UK banks also had
problems: "Awash with bad debts, the big four UK clearers [clearing
banks] are paying the price for over-enthusiasm and weak controls dur-
ing the unprecedented boom of the 1980s."' 57
After Big Bang, the larger banks headed conglomerate financial
services entities, with a wide mix of businesses. An official at the largest
49. J. MILNES HOLDEN, 1 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKING 14 (5th ed. 1991).
50. MARK HAPGOOD, PAGET'S LAW OF BANKING 18 (10th ed. 1989). Deposits are insured up
to £20,000 (about $32,000). Id. at 19.
51. BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 2, at 1-875.
52. Id. at 1001-2000. See MORSE, supra note 33, at 12-16.
53. "Black Monday," October 19, 1987.
54. See REID, supra note 3, at 89-96.
55. John Young, The Consequences of European Financial Integrations for the UK, in EURO-
PEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRETION AND MONETARY CO-OPERATION 127-47 (Paul Van den Bempt &
Marc Quinty eds., 1989).
56. The Bottom Line, THE BANKER, July 1992, at 168.
57. Michael Blanden & Giavin Shreeve, All at Sea, THE BANKER, Mar. 1992, at 7.
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reported: "Barclays has some 275 different services on offer. I suspect
some of these are little used." 58 The larger UK banks found that much
of their business was international, and there were also many foreign
banks operating in London.59 As globalization continues, worldwide
"five major players now have more than 50% of their assets outside their
home countries: a further ten have over 40 %." 60 It will become increas-
ingly more difficult to regulate such banks using regulatory systems
based upon national borders and according to sector boundaries, indus-
try by industry. 61
Within this success story, one can now turn to the bond markets.
As for the gilts, there was "a threefold increase in the number of market
makers .. .-62 Meanwhile, the Eurobond market had been developing
since 1949.63 Today the larger UK corporations have ready access to
debt financing in this Eurobond market. It is the middle-level and
smaller firms who would need to turn to debt financing through corpo-
rate bonds or bank loans. Corporate bonds are still not popular:
An interesting feature, reflecting the growing integration of the inter-
national and domestic capital markets, is that the growth in the ster-
ling bond markets that has occurred has been in the sterling sector of
the Eurobond market, rather than in traditional domestic and 'Bull-
dog' issues. Sterling Eurobond issues rose from U.S. $845m in 1982 to
US $21.7bn in 1988. Traditional domestic issues rose from £527m in
1985 to £1.2bn in 1986, but since then the market has virtually
disappeared. 64
Bank loans would be for smaller corporations: "But the lending de-
cisions most bankers will make are at a far more modest level: £100,000
for a small business rather than £100m for a stock market giant."'65 In
addition, many banks do not see this as part of their current mix of prof-
itable businesses: "An increasing number of banks and financial institu-
tions are formulating strategies which apparently do not include lending
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as a part of their business."'66
The domestic-based criticism coming from portions of the Labour
Party is still valid in Britain: the UK banks do not have a ready or acces-
sible funding mechanism for small and medium-sized business firms.
The banks are too international-minded, and the Eurobond market has
replaced bank lending and corporate bonds for the larger corporations.
66. Brenda Jenna, Lending An Unfashionable Activity, BANKING WORLD, Nov. 1992, at 15.
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